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Fatigue is considered as one of the main causes of motor carrier crashes. To control this 
hazard, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) enforces prescriptive Hours-of-
Service (HOS) regulation. Over the last decade, an emerging consensus has questioned the 
efficiency of this perspective regulation. Consequently, a comprehensive approach called Fatigue 
Risk Management System (FRMS) is becoming popular in the fatigue science.  FRMS has 
transferred the focus of responsibility for safety away from the regulatory bodies towards 
companies and individuals.  
On the other hand, motor carriers should be able to identify which of their organizational 
factors have contributed to their fatigue performance; thus, they will be able to enhance their 
fatigue performance by improving the contributed organizational factors to their fatigue 
performance.  
This research project aimed to investigate the organizational factors and associated safety 
practices that have been contributed to fatigue performance. 134 motor carriers with acceptable 
and unacceptable fatigue performance were studied. The Compliance, Safety, Accountability 
(CSA 2010) measurement system was used to determine the motor carriers’ fatigue performance. 
 
 
The organizational factors which were studied include: management commitment, schedule 
design, HOS management, and training system. Constructing elements for each of these 
organizational factors were identified by the literature review. 
Based on the results of the study, it is suggested that safety budget (as a management 
commitment element), percentage of drivers with regular schedule (as a schedule design 
element), and utilization of electronic logbook (as an HOS management element) are 
contributing factors to fatigue performance among the motor carriers. Consequently, motor 
carriers that are looking for improving their fatigue performance may consider implementing 
best safety practices to improve their fatigue performance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the movement of freights on highways in the United States remained at 
the same level; however, the total number of highway fatalities declined from 42,708 in 2006 to 
33,808 in 2009 – a 20% reduction (Bureau of Transportation, 2011). Although, this is a 
reasonable reduction, still the number of accidents on highways is high. Among 33,808 fatalities 
on highways in 2009, 31% of the fatalities (10,850 cases) were truck occupants (Bureau of 
Transportation, 2011). This indicates that truck accidents are important issue within the US 
transportation sector. 
Driving while fatigued is a major concern among truck occupants. Estimates of the role 
of fatigue in motor vehicle crashes is various in the previous research studies. Typical range cited 
goes from 13% (Balkin, Horrey, Graeber, Czeisler, & Dinges, 2011; Perttula & Ojala, 2011) to 
20% of road crashes occurring on the major roads and motorways (P. Gander et al., 2011). 
In order to control fatigue hazard in the United States, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) introduced perspective Hours-of-Service (HOS) regulations. This 
regulation defines and enforces limits on duration of resting and driving time that Commercial 
Motor Vehicle (CMV) drivers are allowed to take (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
2011). 
The main purpose of the HOS regulation is to ensure drivers are provided with enough 
opportunity to sleep; though, a driver may be provided with the opportunity to sleep, yet be 
fatigued as a result of non-driving tasks or show behavioral symptoms of being fatigued. After 
reviewing various studies, it was found that an emerging consensus has questioned the efficiency 
of these perspective regulations (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005). Consequently, a comprehensive 
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approach called Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) is becoming popular in the fatigue 
science (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005). FRMS approaches fatigue in a holistic way and has 
transferred the focus of responsibility for safety away from the regulatory bodies towards 
companies and individuals.  
Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) 
FMCSA introduced Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA 2010) measurement 
system to improve large truck and bus safety and ultimately reduce crashes, injuries, and 
fatalities which are related to CMVs (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2012). CSA 
measurement system evaluates motor carriers based on the violations they have received during 
inspections. CSA 2010 assesses motor carriers based on seven categories: Unsafe Driving, 
Fatigued Driving, Driver Fitness, Control Substance/Alcohol, Vehicle Maintenance, Cargo-
Related, and Crash Indicator. 
FMCSA has specified intervention threshold levels for each category. If a carrier receives 
a ranking higher than the threshold level on a category, they will undergo more inspection by 
FMCSA officers. The first step in the intervention process is to inform carriers with unacceptable 
performance by a warning letter. If carriers continue to perform above the specified thresholds, 
they will undergo a more rigorous inspection by FMCSA, which costs both the regulatory bodies 
and motor carriers. 
Contributing Organizational Factors to Fatigue Performance 
Fatigue control measures are categorized into three levels: regulatory, organizational, and 
individual. This study focuses on the organizational factors that contribute to fatigue 
performance. Organizational factors are elements that define an organization’s character, 
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property, function and impact (Department of Energy, 2009). The contributing organizational 
factors to fatigue performance that have been studied in this paper were: management 
commitment, schedule design, HOS management, and fatigue training system. 
Management commitment for safety-related activities has been a component for 
successful safety programs (Zohar, 1980). In a study by Arboleda (2003), they found top 
management commitment was a key factor to safety culture among drivers, dispatchers, and 
safety directors. Also, at the supervisory level, workers’ safety compliance is higher when 
supervisors are involved with workers in the accident prevention programs and management 
decision making processes regarding safety (Simard & Marchand, 1997). 
Schedule design covers the driving schedule regularity and driver autonomy issues. One 
of the aspects that makes driving on the roads an especial task is the level of supervision on 
drivers. In the studied research papers, there was a debate on the level of driver autonomy in the 
trucking industry. Karasek  (1981) described stress reduction as a positive aspect of driver 
autonomy. In another study by Feyer and Williams (1995), they stated by improving driver 
autonomy, drivers will take more rest when they become fatigued. On the other hand, some 
studies indicated the negative aspects of driver autonomy as working early in the morning and 
late at night, when higher levels of fatigue-related accidents occurs (Soccomanno, 1996). 
Motor carriers may develop an HOS management framework to ensure their drivers have 
received sufficient sleep and are in compliance with legal limits. For instance, a carrier may 
utilize their vehicles by electronic logbook and on-board monitoring devices to monitor the level 
of fatigue. Another management practice is to ensure that drivers are qualified for driving tasks. 
Some people suffer from certain sleep disorders that deprive them of driving for a long time. For 
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example, people who suffer from sleep apnea feel obstruction during sleep which causes lack of 
sufficient sleep (National Institutes of Health, 2010) and expose them to a fatigue-related risky 
situation.  
Effective fatigue training system is another organizational factor which contributes to 
driver fatigue. Drivers who have received safety-related training understand safety regulations 
and their own organizational viewpoint on driver fatigue. Thus, they will be more aware about 
the hazards that are associated with their job (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Arboleda (2003) identified 
that driver fatigue training is a significant predictor of safety culture in the trucking industry. 
Therefore, they suggested driver fatigue training should be a primary focus in developing safety 
programs. 
Although work-related driving crashes is one of the most common causes of death, 
injury, and absence from work (Bureau of Transportation, 2011), very limited research has 
progressed in establishing effective strategies to control work-related road crashes. Even among 
these research studies, the majority of them have focused on the driver-based data and 
overlooked the importance of the contributing organizational factors to driver fatigue. 
This study begins by providing the research background that identified driver fatigue in 
trucking industry. Given this framework, hypotheses are offered specifying the association 
between the identified organizational factors and fatigue performance of the motor carriers. Next, 
design of the research and methodology is discussed. This is followed by providing the results 
related to hypotheses. The remainder of the paper is dedicated to discussion of the findings and 
developing conclusions and recommendations.
 
 
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Driving while fatigued is one of the main causes of CMV crash injuries (Balkin et al., 
2011; P. Gander et al., 2011). Estimates of the role of fatigue in motor vehicle crashes is various 
in the studied research papers. Typical range cited goes from 13% (Balkin et al., 2011; Perttula 
& Ojala, 2011) to 20% of road crashes occurring on major roads and motorways (P. Gander et 
al., 2011). 
Research studies have shown an association between increasing fatigue which may result 
in increasing error rates and ultimately reduces safety (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005; Perttula & 
Ojala, 2011). Accordingly, safety professionals have argued that fatigue is a preventable 
workplace hazard that organizations may control before it results to an actual accident or injury. 
Definition 
Managing the health and safety risks associated with fatigue in a workplace requires a 
clear definition of fatigue. Gander (2011) stated the following operational definition to 
characterize fatigue: 
―Fatigue is the inability to function at the desired level due to incomplete recovery from 
the demands of prior work and other activities. There are two forms of fatigue: acute and 
chronic fatigue. Acute fatigue can occur when there is inadequate time to rest and recover 
from a work period. Cumulative (chronic) fatigue occurs when there is insufficient 





Lack of sleep is a significant predictor of accidents, driver fatigue, and fatigue-related 
crashes (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005; P. Gander et al., 2011; Perttula & Ojala, 2011). 
Considering the previous statement, preventing driver fatigue generally is recognized as one of 
the most important safety issues within the trucking industry. 
Hours-of-Service Regulation 
To control occupational road crashes resulted from fatigue, governmental bodies have 
developed compliance-based prescriptive regulations on agreed set of rules for managing hours 
of work. FMCSA has introduced and enforced HOS regulation in the US. This regulation put 
restrictions on the following time intervals:  
 Maximum time awake for work 
 Duration of continuous time on duty 
 Minimum opportunities for sleep. 
Table 2-1 tabulated the final version of the HOS regulation (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 2011). It demonstrates the designated limits for both property-carrying and 
passenger-carrying CMV drivers. Based on this regulation, a CMV driver should document the 
following time intervals, routinely: 
 On-duty time: all time from when a driver begins to work or is required to be in 
readiness to work until the driver is relieved from work and all responsibility for 
performing work. 
 Driving time: the time that driver spent at the driving of a CMV. 
 Sleeper berth time: any amount of time spent inside the sleeper berth (e.g., resting or 
sleeping). 
 Off-duty time: any time not spent on-duty, driving, or in the sleeper berth. 
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Table 2-1: Hours-of-Service (HOS) rules by FMCSA 
Property-Carrying CMV Drivers Passenger-Carrying CMV Drivers 
11-Hour Driving Limit 
May drive a maximum of 11 hours after 10 consecutive 
hours off duty. 
10-Hour Driving Limit 
May drive a maximum of 10 hours after 8 consecutive 
hours off duty. 
14-Hour Limit 
May not drive beyond the 14th consecutive hour after 
coming on duty, following 10 consecutive hours off duty. 
Off-duty time does not extend the 14-hour period. 
15-Hour On-Duty Limit 
May not drive after having been on duty for 15 hours, 
following 8 consecutive hours off duty. Off-duty time 
is not included in the 15-hour period. 
60/70-Hour On-Duty Limit 
May not drive after 60/70 hours on duty in 7/8 consecutive 
days. A driver may restart a 7/8 consecutive day period 
after taking 34 or more consecutive hours off duty. 
60/70-Hour On-Duty Limit 
May not drive after 60/70 hours on duty in 7/8 
consecutive days. 
Sleeper Berth Provision 
Drivers using the sleeper berth provision must take at least 
8 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth, plus a separate 2 
consecutive hours either in the sleeper berth, off duty, or 
any combination of the two. 
Sleeper Berth Provision 
Drivers using a sleeper berth must take at least 8 hours 
in the sleeper berth, and may split the sleeper-berth 
time into two periods provided neither is less than 2 
hours. 
Source: (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2011)  
To enforce HOS regulation, CMV drivers are obliged to record and keep a daily logbook 
in the cab and keep their status updated whenever they drive or take rest. A sample logbook is 
shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1: Sample logbook 
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Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) 
Most traditional approaches to fatigue management have focused on HOS regulation.  In 
practice, this regulation if properly enforced only ensures that drivers will be provided with the 
opportunity to sleep and does not specify whether they are fatigued or not. In another words, 
perspective HOS regulation is not a sufficient tool in order to ensure that drivers have taken 
enough rest and are adequate to drive.  
There is an emerging consensus that HOS regulation is an ineffective fatigue control 
measure based on poor scientific defensibility and lack of operational flexibility. Furthermore, 
implementation of HOS regulation is constantly negotiated between employers, workers’ unions, 
and FMCSA for reasons other than safety issues. For instance, an increase in the flexibility of 
HOS regulation has often been interpreted (by employees and their representative) as a dishonest 
attempt to deregulate or disrupt the current or proposed HOS regulation. On the other hand, 
tightening of HOS regulation has sometimes been interpreted (by employer groups and their 
advocates) as an insincere attempt to leverage pay and conditions. Consequently, the HOS 
regulation approach is considered as a labor relations issue, rather than safety management tool 
(McCulloch, Fletcher, & Dawson, 2003). 
To date, most alternative approaches to prescriptive HOS regulation includes fatigue 
management systems within the general context of Safety Management Systems (SMS) (Dawson 
& McCulloch, 2005). Based on the SMS, fatigue is considered as a ―preventable occupational 
health and safety (OH&S) hazard‖ and may be controlled by a risk-based approach.  
In 2005, Dawson introduced a conceptual model called Fatigue Risk Management 
System (FRMS) which is presented in Figure 2-2 (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005). Based on this 
model, fatigue is considered as a hazard. In order to control this hazard, control measures may be 
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developed based on the hierarchy of controls. In the fatigue and safety sciences, the concept of 
FRMS has transferred the focus of responsibility for safety away from the regulator bodies 
towards companies and individuals.  
 
Figure 2-2: Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) Model 
Based on the FRMS, there are five levels of ―error trajectory‖ to occur a fatigue-related 
incident (FRI). Potentially, this model can be utilized to identify the root causes of FRIs in a 
logical and consistent manner. FRMS model indicates that the majority of incidences occur when 
there is not enough opportunity to sleep, which is presented on the first level of the model. On 
the second level of the error trajectory to FRIs, there are situations that employees who are given 
an opportunity to sleep may have not obtained it. These situations may happen as a result of 
individual difference, non-work demand, and sleep disorders.  
On the third level, employees who obtained what is considered, on average, sufficient 
sleep may experience fatigue-related behavioral symptoms. A common behavioral symptom 
could be falling asleep at the wheel, which may result into lane or track change. These behavioral 
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symptoms are considered as near misses of actual crash. On the forth level, some of these near 
misses may result into fatigue-related errors. These errors are actually near misses that could 
result into FRI. On the fifth level, there are some events that actually turn to be a FRI. 
Likewise, there are specific control measures for each level of error trajectory. The first 
level of control measure is to ensure that drivers have been provided with an adequate 
opportunity for sleep. Typically, HOS regulation covers the first level of control. Providing 
drivers with enough opportunity for sleep is not a sufficient control measure. In the second level, 
there should be some control measures to ensure that drivers who are given an adequate 
opportunity for sleep have actually obtained it. 
At the third level, it should be ensured that drivers who had obtained what is considered 
sufficient sleep are not experiencing actual fatigue-related behaviors. The use of symptom 
checklist or subjective fatigue scales are examples of control procedures at this level.  
Similarly, control measures at the fourth level identify the occurrence of fatigue-related 
errors that could be resulted into FRIs. Control measures on this level are more technology-
related such as: lane trackers, head and blink monitors, etc. Finally, an effective FRMS would 
require an incident analysis and investigation procedure to investigate FRIs in situations that all 
control mechanisms failed to prevent the incident.   
Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) 
Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) is an FMCSA standard to improve large truck 
and bus safety and ultimately reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities which are related to CMVs 
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2012). CSA operational model consists of three 
components that are shown in Figure 2-3. According to this standard, all commercial motor 
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vehicles are inspected based on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) and 
Hazardous Material Regulations (HMRs). Based on CSA, each carrier is assessed in seven 
categories: Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving, Driver Fitness, Control Substance/Alcohol, 
Vehicle Maintenance, Cargo-Related, and Crash Indicator. 
There are specific threshold levels for each category that if a company exceeds them, 
motor carriers will be further investigated in the intervention phase. These carriers, at first will 
receive a warning letter.  If they continue to perform above the specified thresholds, they will be 
inspected more rigorously by FMCSA, which costs both the regulatory bodies and motor 
carriers.  
 
Figure 2-3: CSA operational model 
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Categories that motor carriers are evaluated are called Behavior Analysis and Safety 
Improvement Categories (BASICs) and are defined as follows (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 2012): 
 Unsafe Driving:  operation of CMV in a dangerous or careless manner. Example 
violations: speeding, reckless driving, improper lane change, and inattention. 
 Fatigued Driving (HOS): operation of CMVs by drivers who are ill, fatigued, or in non-
compliance with the HOS regulations. Example violations: exceeding HOS, maintaining 
an incomplete or inaccurate logbook. 
 Driver Fitness: operation of CMVs by drivers who are unfit to operate a CMV due to 
lack of training, experience, or medical qualifications. Example violations: failure to have 
a valid and appropriate commercial driver’s license. 
 Controlled Substance/Alcohol: operation of CMVs by drivers who are impaired due to 
alcohol, illegal drugs, and misuse of prescription or over-the-counter medications. 
Example violations: use or possession of controlled substances/alcohol. 
 Vehicle Maintenance: failure to properly maintain a CMV. Example violations: brakes, 
lights, and other mechanical defects, and failure to make required repairs. 
 Cargo-Related: failure to properly prevent shifting loads, spilled or dropped cargo, 
overloading, and unsafe handling of hazardous materials on a CMV. Example 
violations: improper load securement, cargo retention. 




Based on the CSA methodology, carriers are ranked and those that receive unacceptable 
safety performance among the similar groups have been identified and preceded for further 
interventions.   
Fatigued Driving Category in CSA 2010 
CSA 2010 covers the fatigue-related issues in the Fatigued Driving category. This 
category involves the violations that resulted from operating a CMV by drivers who are ill, 
fatigued, or in non-compliance with the HOS regulation (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 2012). Appendix A is a complete list of roadside inspection violations used in 
the calculation of Fatigued Driving percentile.  
CSA 2010 utilize relevant violations recorded during roadside inspections to calculate 
Fatigue Driving percentile. The assigned percentile reflects each carrier’s safety posture relative 
to carriers with similar numbers of relevant inspections. 
Calculation of Fatigued Driving Measure 
The equation used for calculating Fatigued Driving category measure is as follows 
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2012): 
             
                                                        
                                        
 
Equation 2-1 
Terms used in this equation are defined as follows: 
 Applicable violation: any violation in a roadside inspection that matches the FMCSRs 
listed for Fatigued Driving (Appendix A) during the past 24 months. 
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 Relevant inspection: any driver inspection including those that do not result in a 
violation in the BASIC, or any other inspection resulting in an applicable BASIC 
violation. 
 Severity weight: an score which is assigned to each applicable violation with a value 
dependent on two parts:  
i. The level of crash risk relative to the other violations comprising the BASIC 
measurement. This level is assigned to each applicable violation ranging from 1 
(less severe) to 10 (most severe). Violations’ corresponding severity weights are 
presented in Appendix A.  
ii. Whether or not the violation resulted in an out-of-service (OOS) condition. If an 
OOS has occurred, an OOS weight of 2 is then added to the severity weights.  
 Time weight: a time weight of 1, 2, or 3 is assigned to each applicable violation and each 
relevant inspection based on its age. Violations/inspections recorded in the past 6 months 
receive a time weight of 3. Violations/inspections recorded between 6 and 12 months ago 
receive a time weight of 2. All violations/inspections recorded earlier (older than 12 
months but within the past 24 months) receive a time weight of 1. This time weight 
places more emphasis on results of recent inspections relative to older inspections.  
 Time and severity weighted violation: a violation’s severity weight multiplied by its 
time weight.  
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Calculation of Fatigued Driving Percentile Rank  
CSA methodology applies data sufficiency standards and safety event grouping to assign 
a percentile rank to carriers. This percentile rank is utilized as a safety performance measure for 
motor carriers. Calculation of percentile rank is as follows: 
1. Firstly, the number of relevant inspection and number of inspections with at least one 
BASIC violation is determined. Then, carriers will be assigned a safety event grouping 
based on their number of relevant inspections. Table 2-2 indicates the safety event 
grouping for the Fatigued Driving category. 
2. Within each group, all the carriers’ BASIC measures are ranked in ascending order. The 
ranked values are transformed into percentile from 0 (representing the lowest BASIC 
measure) to 100 (representing the highest BASIC measure). Thus, the higher the 
percentile, the worse safety performance the carrier has performed when comparing to 
other motor carriers.  
 
 
Contributing Organizational Factors to Fatigue Performance 
There are three different operational levels when it comes to fatigue risk management: 
regulatory, organizational, and individual levels. However, these three levels are significantly 
interacted with each other, this study focuses on organizational factors and the control measures 
Table 2-2: Safety event groups for the Fatigued Driving category 








that an organization may take in order to control fatigue hazard. Organizational factors are 
elements that define an organization’s character, property, function, and impact (Department of 
Energy, 2009).  
A wide range of organizational factors have been identified which may impact fatigue 
management in transportation sector. Some of the articles studied the organizational factors in 
the safety culture concept. Reasen (1998) mentioned that improvement in organizational safety 
culture is more effective than increased supervision or more rigorous procedures in enhancing 
safety performance.  
Arnold (2001) studied the factors that negatively and positively may impact fatigue in 
transportation including: 
 The cultural, regulatory, and enforcement environments; 
 The size of the company; 
 The nature of the business (type of transported material); 
 The level of commitment to health and safety in the company; 
 The presence of SMS, including systems for non-punitive reporting of safety concerns; 
 The nature of supervision (in transport operations employees are typically mobile and can 
be out of contact with supervisors for a long period of time); 
 Incentives; 
 The level of knowledge about fatigue among staff; and; 
 For individual employees, their perceived quality of working and domestic life. 
 
Arboleda (2003) studied 116 trucking firms to identify how different positions within an 
organization have different perception of safety culture. The organizational levels they analyzed 
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were: drivers, dispatchers (who are the supervisors in the trucking industry), and safety directors. 
They found safety training, opportunity for safety participation, and management commitment to 
safety are antecedents of safety culture in all organizational levels. 
Moses (1994) studied 75,500 registered truck firms in the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) database. They analyzed the entire FHWA motor carrier safety records 
and identified the following factors as contributing factors to fatigue in motor carriers: 
 Demographic differences (size, type of operation, and employment)  
 Fatigue training system 
 Driver recruitment 
 Compliance management. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the current knowledge and practices in regard to 
organizational factors in the field of fatigue risk management. Considering this point and the 
above studies, the organizational factors that are studied in more detail are as follows: 
 Management commitment 
 Schedule design 
 HOS management 
 Training system. 
Management commitment  
Management support and appreciation for safety-related activities has been a condition 
for successful safety programs (Zohar, 1980). Management commitment is recognized as an 
important predictor of employees’ compliance with safety measures. Also, in the supervisory 
level, workers’ safety compliance is higher when supervisors are involved with workers in the 
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accident prevention programs and management decision making processes regarding safety 
(Simard & Marchand, 1997).  
In Arboleda (2003) study, they found top management commitment was a very 
influential factor to safety culture among drivers, dispatchers, and safety directors.  Based on the 
above studies, safety program evaluation, fatigue risk management policy, and safety incentives 
were identified as elements of management commitment factor.  
Safety program evaluation 
An important challenge for the FRMS is the evaluation of the implemented safety 
programs. This challenge also applies more broadly to safety management systems, as 
safety program evaluation is a key factor in the overall safety management continuous 
improvement process. Self-evaluation is an intrinsic feature of safety management 
systems, including FRMS, which helps organizations to learn and develop their own 
safety management strategies in a changing environment (P. Gander et al., 2011).  
Ideally, an organization may evaluate its FRMS by comparing its fatigue 
performance before and after implementation of the safety programs. This process may 
be conducted both internally and/or externally. The choice of improvement indicators is 
essential. Typically, fatigue reduction and productivity improvement are leading 
indicators of FRMS.  
Fatigue risk management policy 
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Fatigue risk management policy should be part of a company’s safety policy and 
it must be open and transparent. An effective fatigue risk management policy should at 
least cover the following elements (P. Gander et al., 2011):  
 Commitment to the fatigue risk management from the highest level of the 
organization; 
 Specification of accountability for fatigue risk management in the organization; 
 Description of the responsibilities of company management and employees; 
 Terms of references for the Fatigue Management Steering Committee (FMSC), 
including frequency of meetings; 
 Documentation of fatigue reporting mechanisms; 
 Policies for identifying and managing employees who are fatigued; 
 Commitment to provide training; 
 Commitment to act on recommendations regarding fatigue risk management 
arising from internal audits.  
Safety incentives 
Historically, work that is more hazardous attracts higher remuneration and fosters 
less safe practices (P. Gander et al., 2011). The common practice of paying truck drivers 
by the distance travelled or by the load delivered may encourage speeding and excessive 
hours of work and has been identified as contributor to major truck crashes (National 




One of the greatest aspects of over-the-road truck driving work is the autonomy to set 
one’s own work schedule (i.e. determine when to drive and when to rest). Flexible work schedule 
increasingly are being adopted by organizations to satisfy employees’ desire for this form of 
autonomy.  
There are different research studies that mentioned the positive and negative aspects of 
driver autonomy. Karasek (1981) stated that employee’s autonomy seems to diminish the amount 
of perceived overload and provides a control measure to cope with stress. In a study by Feyer 
and Williams (1992), they surveyed 960 truck drivers and suggested shorter trips and greater 
flexibility in arranging the timing and scheduling of trips were related to lower levels of reported 
fatigue. They concluded when drivers are provided with more flexible schedule they were more 
likely to arrange their time to overcome fatigue and avoid starting their trips in the early hours of 
the morning. 
Furthermore, scheduling autonomy may create positive effects by allowing drivers to use 
their own unique circadian rhythms. Also, autonomy for drivers allows them to adjust 
themselves to unpredictable driving situations such as: heavy traffic, weather problems, and 
accommodate individual differences in the need for sleeping and rest.  
On the other hand, permitting scheduling autonomy may have unintended negative 
effects when it interferes with suppliers and customer schedules. In fact, drivers have to stick to 
the customer needs; otherwise, there would be some negative effects for the organization they 
work for. In practice, this form of job autonomy in the trucking industry may become a hazard if 
drivers work at night or in the early morning, when there is a higher possibility of fatigue-related 
accident (Soccomanno, 1996). 
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Scheduling autonomy also allows drivers to deviate from the natural 24-hour rhythm of 
work that favors daytime work schedules over nighttime work schedules that cause circadian 
fatigue (Soccomanno, 1996). Even in situations that drivers have less autonomy over work, 
fatigue may occur. Braver et al. (1999) found that dispatchers rarely think they are assigning 
tight schedules to drivers, while drivers report feeling pressured by dispatchers to continue 
driving even when they are fatigued (Chatterjee et al., 1996).  
 Overall, in the trucking industry drivers’ autonomy may not have all the positive 
implications that the literature describes for other industries (Karasek et al., 1981).  For instance, 
in the Soccomanno (1996) study, they stated reducing driver autonomy by requiring drivers to 
drive the same hours each day following prescribed routes could enhance safety, as these 
practices diminish fatigue. Moreover, if hours of work are not well monitored and non-driving 
work is not compensated, there would be an incentive for drivers to exercise their job autonomy 
and drive longer to increase their compensation based on mileage reimbursement (Williams, 
2001).  
Hours-of-Service (HOS) Management 
Fatigue differs from most of OH&S hazards such as exposure to noise, toxic substances, 
and fall/slip hazards. The difference is that fatigue is affected by all of the waking activities, not 
only those that are work-related. An organization may develop an HOS compliance program in 
order to control fatigue. The purpose of HOS management program is to provide adequate 
opportunity to sleep for drivers. In the following sections, an overview of the HOS management 
program is presented. 
Restrictions on the amount of sleep and wakefulness 
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Based on the FRMS, employers should ensure that employees who have been 
provided with the opportunity to sleep (by HOS regulation) have actually obtained it. In 
recent years, there has been an emerging consensus that many of perspective shift work 
rules do not provide a reliable control mechanism that prevents fatigued individuals from 
unsafe working practices (Dawson & McCulloch, 2005). This is primarily due to a failure 
to distinguish between non-work and sleep time in determining the recovery value of 
time-off.  
Dawson (2005) suggested that knowledge of the frequency distribution of prior 
sleep and wake hours could give a rational basis for determining the level of fatigue an 
individual is likely to experience within a given shift. He introduced Prior Sleep Wake 
Model (PSWM) which is presented in Figure 2-4. Based on this model, effective fatigue-
risk management can be determined by an algorithm that is comprised of three simple 
calculations:  
 X: prior sleep in the last 24 hours  
 Y: prior sleep in the last 48 hours 
 Z: the length of wakefulness from awaking to the end of work. 
To facilitate PSWM, organizations should develop appropriate threshold levels 
for each of the stated criteria. It is important to note that the thresholds may potentially 
vary as a function of fatigue-related risk within a workplace. For example, the threshold 
values may be adjusted to a more conservative level for a task that exposes employees to 
a higher level of fatigue. 
Then, prior to commencing work, an employee should determine whether they 
have obtained the required threshold for being sleep and awake or not. Where obtained 
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sleep does not meet the threshold, there would be a significant increase in the likelihood 
of a fatigue-related error. In this situation, the organization should implement appropriate 
hazard control procedures for the individual.  
 
Figure 2-4: Dawson’s Prior Sleep Wake Model (PSWM) 
Also, a carrier may prevent drivers of driving after being declared as OOS. This 
situation occurs when a driver have been driving more than the regulated limits. In 
Australia and New Zealand, there is a regulation named ―chain of responsibility‖ 
offences (P. Gander et al., 2011). Based on this regulation, a person who employs or 
controls drivers subject to the HOS regulation limits can be fined up to $25,000 if they 
knew, or should have known, that a driver under their authority breached those limits.  
Logbook system 
Based on the HOS regulation, drivers have to keep their work logbook properly 
updated (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2011). Commonly, there are paper 
logbooks that drivers fill out daily. These logbooks are investigated during roadside 
inspections. Filling out a paper logbook typically comes with human errors. Moreover, 
keeping track of the working and driving hours may be overlooked by some drivers. 
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Thus, some companies have changed their logbook system to electronic logbook system, 
which drivers have a better control on their hours of driving. 
 
Medical examination 
An important part of an FRMS is to ensure that drivers are qualified for driving 
tasks (P. Gander et al., 2011). Some people have certain sleep disorders that deprive them 
of driving for a long time. For instance, people who suffer from sleep apnea feel 
obstruction during sleep, causing lack of sufficient sleep (National Institutes of Health, 
2010) and exposing them to a fatigue-related risky situation. To manage these risks, 
strategies that include diagnosis and treatment of sleep disorders should be available in a 
timely manner and there should be a clear policy around conditions of return to work.  
Fatigue reporting system 
In order to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents or accidents, the safety 
management system in the trucking industry largely depends on reporting. Fatigue 
reporting can be a part of a wider hazard reporting system. If a fatigue reporting system 
properly implemented and more near misses are reported, there would be higher 
probability that the situations that provoke FRIs be identified and controlled.  
Steps to encourage a reporting culture include: making the process of reporting 
easy, report fatigues as soon as possible, make informative feedback to the reporter on 
action taken, obvious policy against disciplinary action unless the event involves 
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deliberate action, and the opportunity for confidentiality and anonymity (P. Gander et al., 
2011). 
Modern approaches in safety management emphasize the use of ―leading 
indicators‖ (those which appear early in the existing of risk), rather than the more 
traditional focus on ―lagging indicators‖ (including actual incidents), which appear later 
and often require a more urgent response (Reason, 1997). Fatigue reporting system is a 
good example of a leading indicator and responding to the reported cases can be viewed 
as a proactive or even preventive measure rather than responding reactively to FRIs (P. 
Gander et al., 2011). 
Voluntary fatigue reporting system provides one type of ongoing monitoring of 
fatigue hazard in an organization. In addition, information can be gathered through 
methods such as staff surveys and other routinely collected information such as 
absenteeism, staff turnover, and internal/external audits, etc. 
On-board control devices 
A number of technologies have been developed that aims to detect operator 
fatigue in real time (Balkin et al., 2011). These technologies are onboard devices that 
monitor drivers’ state or level of performance as well as devices that predict fatigue in 
advance of work cycle or trip. Examples of these technologies are: lane trackers, video 
capture systems, head and eye blink monitors. These devices can be used either to trigger 
alarms or to activate other safety systems. For instance, head and eye blink systems 
monitor eye closure and in cases extreme drowsiness is evident, an alert signal will be 
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triggered. In an effective FRMS, it is important to consider balance of investment in 
technologies to detect fatigue versus strategies to mitigate it. 
Fatigue Training System 
Based on a report by Federal Highway Administration (1997), driver training is 
considered as one of the most fundamental elements in an FRMS. Drivers who have received 
safety-related training understand organizational safety incentive systems, have greater 
knowledge regarding the regulations and why they have to adhere to them, and are more aware 
about the hazards in their workplace (Griffin & Neal, 2000). 
Arboleda et al. (2003) identified that driver fatigue training is a significant predictor of 
safety culture in the trucking industry. Therefore, they suggested driver fatigue training should 
be a primary focus in developing a safety program. An effective FRMS provides a common 
knowledge and should include (P. Gander et al., 2011): 
 Explanation of the current state of knowledge about physiological, psychological, and 
operational factors that cause fatigue; 
 Discussion of the specific operational hazards that are exacerbated by fatigue; 
 Education on the use of appropriate fatigue mitigation strategies, including strategies to 
assist drivers to arrive at work in the least fatigued condition and tactics to help maintain 
a safe level of functioning at work and commuting home;  
 Role and responsibilities for fatigue reporting system, consequences of coming to work 




Training and education should be specified for different groups in the organization. Thus, 
the content and depth of knowledge may vary for managers, drivers, dispatchers, and safety staff. 
Enabling employees to be aware about the nature of fatigue and how they can control it will 
diminish the view that fatigue is somehow an indication of personal inadequacy. This awareness 
shows that fatigue is a normal consequence of an imbalance between the exertion of work and 
other waking activities and is recovered by sleeping (P. Gander et al., 2011). 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of driver fatigue training is an overlooked area. An 
evaluation of a fatigue training program for light and heavy vehicle drivers who were working 
for a major oil company found significant improvement in knowledge immediately after a 2-hour 
live training session, which was still effective for the following 26 months after the training (P. 
H. Gander, Le Quesne, L., Armstrong, H., Feyer,, 2005). At follow-up, the great majority of the 
study group rated their training as at least moderately useful. About half of the group, reported 
changing their fatigue management strategies at home as a result of training, and half of them 
reported changing their strategies at work. They concluded that fatigue training is useful for 
developing a fatigue management culture within an organization.  
A comprehensive FRMS includes both strategies to reduce the likelihood of employees 
being fatigued at work (e.g., better work schedule) and strategies to mitigate the risk represented 




CHAPTER 3: ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES 
This chapter explores the identified problems in fatigue management in the trucking 
industry. It continues with the objectives of this study and the proposed hypotheses.  
Statement of the Problem 
The threshold level for Fatigued Driving category in CSA measurement system is 65. 
Carriers which receive a percentile ranking above this threshold will be in the intervention zone 
by FMCSA. According to the CSA database released on December 2011, there were more than 
27,000 motor carriers which have received rankings above the specified threshold level on 
Fatigued Driving category. These carriers should implement fatigue control measures in their 
organizations to control fatigue and reduce their rankings; otherwise, they will be held in the 
intervention zone and will undergo comprehensive inspections and follow-up actions. 
CSA 2010 has proved that there were 27,000 motor carriers with an obvious unacceptable 
performance in Fatigued Driving category. In practice, driver fatigue is not limited to these 
carriers which have received a score above threshold level in CSA. In fact, CSA 2010 is not a 
validated measurement system and it may incorrectly overlook some carriers with unacceptable 
safety performance. Consequently, there may be more carriers that suffer from not properly 
managing fatigue hazard in their organization. As an example, in December 2011, there were 
9,000 motor carriers that received a percentile above 50 and below 65, yet they were not covered 
in the intervention process by FMCSA.  
These carriers should monitor and manage their fatigued driving performance and 
improve their scores before they are transferred to the intervention zone. In this way, they will be 
able to handle the problem in a timely manner and focus more on the long-term and effective 
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control measures instead of some short-term and expensive ones. Also, there is a possibility that 
FMCSA changes the threshold level which will be resulted into a sudden obligation of 
improvement in the Fatigued Driving category for some carriers. 
Even carriers that have received rankings below 50 and are considered acceptable in their 
performance on Fatigued Driving category may consider their Fatigued Driving ranking as an 
external evaluation measure to monitor their fatigue performance. In fact, they may utilize this 
external tool to evaluate how their corrective actions affected their fatigue performance. Overall, 
improvement on Fatigued Driving category would benefit all the registered carriers in the CSA 
database.  
Based on the CSA intervention process, carriers that have received a ranking percentile 
above the threshold level in Fatigue Driving category have received warning letters. However, 
the only information available to these carriers is the number and type of violations that they 
have received.  
In order to improve Fatigued Driving ranking, a carrier may implement different safety 
programs. But the point is that there are limited scientific studies to suggest that a specific 
control measure (i.e., training, management commitment, medical examination, remuneration 
and incentives, etc.) will result into an improvement in fatigue management and specifically 
Fatigued Driving category in CSA. 
Secondly, carriers with unacceptable fatigue performance should be able to identify 
which of their organizational factors and associated safety practices contributed to their 
unacceptable fatigue performance. Accordingly, they will be able to develop plans to improve 




Thirdly, even carriers with acceptable fatigue performance may not recognize which of 
their organizational factors and implemented safety practices have contributed to their fatigue 
performance.  In this regard, they may implement a control measure which is not recommended 
to contribute to fatigue performance improvement or overlook some safety practices that had 
contributed to their fatigue performance. 
Finally, because of the nature of CSA measurement system which is based on the HOS 
regulation, carriers with unacceptable fatigue performance may emphasis on complying with 
HOS regulation. Although, this control measure only fulfill the first level of FRMS, carriers 
should be informed that there are other control measures on the higher levels of FRMS that 
contribute to their fatigue performance as well. 
Objectives 
In order to improve the implementation of FRMS, a better understanding of the complex 
relationship between organizational factors and fatigue performance is essential. The 
organizational factors that have been studied in this research project were introduced in Chapter 
(2). In all of the stated studies, the main focus of the researchers was to determine if there was 
any positive or negative association between organizational factors and safety performance. 
Indeed, there is limited research on measuring effectiveness of implemented safety programs to 
control fatigue based on an integrated and external safety measurement system like CSA 2010. 
The purpose of this research project was to identify the contributing organizational 
factors that resulted into acceptable or unacceptable performance for motor carriers in the 
Fatigued Driving category. The results of this research would assist carriers to plan to improve or 
keep their fatigue performance below the threshold levels effectively and efficiently. 
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Followings are the hypotheses of this research project:  
1. Management is more committed to safety in carriers with better fatigue 
performance. 
2. Carriers that consider more fatigue and safety issues in route and schedule design 
phase have better fatigue performance. 
3. Carriers that have implemented more safety programs to manage their drivers’ 
hours-of-services have better fatigue performance.  
4. Carriers that provide more training to their employees (dispatchers and drivers) 




CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
As it was explained in Chapter (3), the main hypothesis of this study was to determine the 
organizational factors that contribute to fatigue performance. To address this issue, motor 
carriers with the best and the worst fatigue performance had been selected from the CSA 2010 
database. A survey instrument which addresses fatigue and safety control measures in the motor 
vehicle industry was developed. Then, the surveys were distributed between the selected motor 
carriers and the received responses were analyzed to support or reject the hypotheses of this 
study. 
Carrier Selection 
All of the motor carriers, which are authorized to operate in the United States, have a 
unique DOT number. In December 2010, FMCSA implemented CSA 2010 on all of the 
registered motor carriers, nationwide. CSA 2010 provides an external and integrated safety 
performance assessment tool to evaluate motor carriers.  Therefore, in order to obtain the 
necessary information for the objectives of this study the CSA database was utilized. 
CSA database have been acquired through the FMCSA Website. There are two categories 
of information for each carrier in the database. The first category is the general information 
which covers: DOT number, contact information, and number of power units and drivers. The 
second category of information is the rankings of the motor carriers on each CSA category. A list 
of the available information for each carrier in the CSA database is presented in Appendix B. 
Based on the scope of this research, motor carriers that did not match the criteria of the 
study were removed from the target population. Following criteria were considered when 
selecting motor carriers from the target population: 
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 Carrier headquarters inside the United States: in the CSA database, there are a 
number of carriers which their headquarters are not located in the United States. 
Headquarters of the majority of them are located in Canada and Mexico. In fact, the 
environment and regulatory organizations that have jurisdiction over them are outside of 
the US. These motor carriers were removed from the target population. 
 Minimum number of 10 drivers: truck drivers who are operating their own trucks are 
considered as Owner-Operators (OO). These truck drivers are not considered as an 
organization, yet they have specific records in the CSA database. Thus, studying these 
operators would not assist to identify the contributing organizational factors to fatigue 
performance. Consequently, in order to properly address the motor carriers that inherit an 
organizational framework, it was assumed that they should employ a minimum number 
of 10 drivers. In this case, these companies may develop safety programs to control their 
fatigue performance. Another purpose was to remove small firms that operate only 
seasonally. Considering these points, motor carriers with less than 10 drivers were 
removed from the database. 
 Not registered as passenger transportation: safety regulations, CSA intervention 
thresholds, and nature of the passenger transportation carriers are different from other 
motor carriers. Consequently, motor carriers which transport passengers were removed 
from the database. 
 Available data on Fatigued Driving and Unsafe Driving categories: as it was 
mentioned in Chapter 2, CSA measurement system evaluates motor carriers based on 
seven different categories: Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving, Driver Fitness, Controlled 
Substance/Alcohol, Vehicle Maintenance, Cargo-Related, and Crash Indicator. The 
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category which covers fatigue-related issues and HOS regulation is Fatigued Driving 
category. In addition to Fatigued Driving category, Unsafe Driving category was 
considered in this study as a safety performance indicator for motor carriers. The 
rationale behind choosing a second criterion as a safety performance indicator was that 
currently CSA 2010 is not a validated evaluation system. For example, a carrier may have 
been ranked as unacceptable in Fatigued Driving category, in condition that the carrier 
was incorrectly evaluated as unacceptable in that category. However, if a carrier has been 
ranked in two different categories as unacceptable, it is more likely for the carrier to 
perform unacceptable. Thus, carriers which had data on both Fatigued Driving and 
Unsafe Driving categories were selected for further consideration.  
 
After removing the carriers that did not meet the above criteria, the remnant carriers 
shaped the target population.  
Based on the Fatigued Driving scale, motor carriers are ranked from 0 to 100, which 
higher ranking on the scale indicates worse safety performance for that carrier. Consequently, 
this scale has been utilized to select the motor carriers with the best and the worst fatigue 
performance. Based on the hypothesis, it was assumed that these two study populations, carriers 
with the best and the worst fatigue performance, possessed different organizational factors that 
resulted into different fatigue performance among carriers.  
The rankings that carriers have received on Fatigue Driving and Unsafe Driving 
categories indicated whether they had ―acceptable‖ or ―unacceptable‖ fatigue performance. 
Those carriers that had received rankings below 25 in Fatigued Driving and Unsafe Driving 
categories were considered as carriers with ―acceptable fatigue performance‖ (AFP) and carriers 
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that had received rankings above 75 on these categories were considered as carriers with 
―unacceptable fatigue performance‖ (UFP). The rationale to choose these intervals was to select 
the companies with the best and the worst fatigue performance as further from each other as 
possible.  Figure 4-1 illustrates the position of the acceptable and unacceptable fatigue 
performance study populations on the Fatigued Driving ranking scale. 
 
Figure 4-1: Carriers with unacceptable and acceptable fatigue performance on Fatigued Driving 
scale 
 
As it is presented in Table 4-1, by December 2011, there were 1,278,153 registered motor 
carriers in the CSA database. 12,489 of the registered carriers met the criteria for this study. 
Among these carriers, 1,116 motor carriers ranked below 25 on Unsafe Driving and Fatigued 
Driving categories and 724 motor carriers ranked above 75 on these categories. These last two 
populations shaped the study populations for this research. 
Table 4-1: Number of motor carriers in target and study populations 
 Number of motor carriers 
Total number of registered motor carriers 1,278,153 
Carriers that meet the criteria for this research 12,489 






In order to gather information from the motor carriers a survey instrument was 
developed. The basis of the survey for this study was a survey by Arbodela (2003). Their survey 
was customized based on the literature review and hypotheses of this study. Table 4-2 indicates 
the identified dependent and independent variables which were related to the hypotheses of the 
study. For each of the dependent and independent variables, a question was considered in the 
survey. 
Questions were developed in four categories: management commitment, schedule design, 
HOS management, and training system. Overall, there were 28 questions concerning the safety 
practices that the company has implemented in order to control fatigue. Indeed, there were not 
any questions regarding individuals or their perception on driver fatigue; instead questions 






Table 4-2: Dependent and independent variables 






Safety program evaluation 
Follow-up programs 
Formal fatigue control policy 
Safety budget 
Incentives – on-time delivery 
Incentives – safe driving 
2 Schedule design CSA Fatigued 
Driving 
 
Considering individual differences 
Fatigue issues considerations in route design 













Determination the least limit of sleep hours 
before work 
Restriction of wakefulness 






Prevent drivers of loading/unloading 
Contact with shippers 
Give more time for flexible schedule 
4 Training system CSA Fatigued 
Driving 
 








Then, the draft survey was distributed between 22 experts to obtain their comments on 
the survey. Experts were in various fields from linguistics and survey development to safety and 
transportation professionals.  Appendix C is the email which was sent to the experts. The main 
areas of the concern that had been asked from the experts were: 
 Appropriateness in length 
 Clearness of the questions  
 Reaction of the respondents to think about their organizations 
 Survey navigation 
 Survey interface. 
Besides the above areas of concern, comments from experts were received about the 
possible questions that might be added to or be removed from the survey. Experts provided their 
ideas on how survey questions might be changed to address driver fatigue issues more properly 
and receive more responses from the motor carriers. Afterwards, the survey was revised and the 
final version of the survey was submitted for the institutional review board (IRB) approval to 
the East Carolina University IRB Committee. The survey and IRB Approval is provided in 
Appendix D, and Appendix E, consecutively. 
Data Gathering 
Participants of the survey were email addresses that motor carriers declared to FMCSA 
for corresponding purposes. These email addresses were available on the CSA database. It was 
assumed that the persons who check these emails had authority in their company and were 
familiar with their organization’s safety management.  
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The survey was published on an on-line survey provider called ―Qualtrics‖. By using this 
Web-based software, paper survey was transformed to a Web-based version. Then, surveys were 
distributed between the selected carriers. The email that the carriers had received is provided in 
Appendix F. In the emails that motor carriers had received, it was indicated that they should 
respond in two weeks.  Furthermore, three reminder emails had been sent to them in the 
following two weeks of launching the survey. 
Data Analysis 
Once the survey participation deadline was passed, the completed responses were 
exported from the ―Qualtrics‖ to PASW (Predictive Analytics SoftWare) Version 18. 
Afterwards, data analysis was conducted to reject or retain the hypotheses of this study. The 
statistical tests that were utilized were based on the nature of the dependent and independent 
variables (James D. Leeper, 2000). Table 4-3 presents these statistical testes. Based on the nature 
of the dependent variable, Chi-square and Mann-Whitney tests were performed to assess the 
difference in distribution between motor carriers with acceptable and unacceptable fatigue 
performance. Then, based on the procedure for each statistical test, null hypothesis were rejected 




Table 4-3: Selection of statistical tests 
Nature of independent 
variable 
Nature of dependent 
variable(s) 
Test(s) 
1 IV with 2 levels 
(independent groups) 
Interval and normal 2 independent sample 
t-test 
Ordinal or interval Mann-Whitney test 
Categorical Chi-square test 
Fisher’s exact test 
1 IV with 2 or more levels 
(independent groups) 
Interval and normal One-way ANOVA 
Ordinal or interval Mann-Whitney test 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Categorical Chi-square test 
Fisher’s exact test 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESULT 
The link for the surveys was emailed to 1,369 motor carriers which met the participation 
criteria. According to the criteria introduced in Chapter (4), 846 (61.8%) carriers were in the 
AFP category and 505 (36.9%) carriers were in the UFP category. Among them, 94 AFP carriers 
(11.1% of the total AFP carriers) and 40 UFP carriers (7.9% of the total UFP carriers) responded 
to the survey. Table 5-1 shows the frequency of the participated carriers in the study.  
 N n Percent 
AFP 846 94 70.1 
UFP 505 40 29.9 
Total 1351 134 100.0 
 
For each organizational factor category (management commitment, schedule design, 
HOS management, training system) a list of contributing elements were identified. These 
elements were presented in Table 4-2. Then, hypotheses of the research, based on Table 4-3 were 
tested by the proper statistical tools.  
Management Commitment 
Table 5-2 shows the null hypotheses and results of statistical tools for management 
commitment factor. There were two null hypotheses that were rejected. The distributions of the 
safety program evaluation variable were not the same in the two study population (χ2 (1, n=134) 
= 4.1, p= .043). As it is shown in Figure 5-1, in a situation that all of the UFP carriers (n=40) 
stated they evaluated their safety programs, 90% (n=85) of the AFP carriers declared they 
implemented a safety evaluation program.  
Another variable which showed different distribution among two groups was the amount 
of allocated budget for safety (U (1) = 1270, Z= -2.9, p= .003). 51% (n= 47) of the AFP carriers 
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allocated budgets above $ 20,001 per year for their safety programs; on contrary, 23% (n=9) of 
UFP carriers assigned the same amount of budget per year. Figure 5-2 shows that carriers that 
have assigned more safety budget have performed better regarding driver fatigue. 
Table 5-2: Null hypotheses and results of statistical tests for management commitment factor 
 












The distribution of 
―safety program 
evaluation‖ is the same 










134 4.1 1 - .043 Reject 
2 
The distribution of 
―follow-up programs‖ 
is the same across 









134 1.4 1 - .230 Retain 
3 
The distribution of 
―formal policy‖ is the 
same across categories 








134 0.0 1 - .868 Retain 
4 
The distribution of 
―safety budget‖ is the 
same across categories 









134 1270.0 1 -2.9 .003 Reject 
5 
The distribution of 
―Incentives – on-time 
delivery‖ is the same 









Square 134 3.6 
1 - .059 Retain 
6 
The distribution of 
―Incentives – safe 
driving‖ is the same 









Square 134 0.7 





Figure 5-1: Distribution of carriers that evaluates their safety program within different 
categories of fatigue performance 
 
 




Table 5-3 shows the null hypotheses and results of the statistical tools for the schedule 
design factor. All of the null hypotheses related to the schedule design factor were rejected. 
There were more UFP carriers that considered individual differences when assigning driving 
tasks to their drivers (χ2 (1, n=125) = 16.3, p<.001).  Figure 5-3 shows that 52% (n= 45) of AFP 
carriers and 90% (n= 34) of UFP carriers considered this point in their company. 
 






Table 5-3: Null hypotheses and results of statistical tests for schedule design factor 
No. 












The distribution of 
―considering 
individual differences‖ 
is the same across 









Square 125 16.3 
1 - <.001 Reject 
8 
The distribution of 
―Fatigue issues 
considerations in route 
design‖ is the same 










Square 126 14.3 
1 - <.001 Reject 
9 
The distribution of 
―Fatigue issues 
considerations in 
schedule design‖ is the 











Square 129 9.3 
1 - .002 Reject 
10 
The distribution of 
―Team drivers‖ is the 










134 1500.5 1 -2.3 .025 Reject 
11 
The distribution of 
―Irregular schedule‖ is 
the same across 










134 681.5 1 -5.0 <.001 Reject 
 
Regarding considering fatigue issues in the design phase, more UFP carriers considered 
fatigue issues in route and schedule design. As it is shown in Figure 5-4, 55% (n=48) of AFP 
carriers and 90% (n=34) of UFP carriers considered fatigue issues while planning routes (χ2 (1, 
n=126) = 14.2, p<.001).  Likewise, 63% (n= 57) of AFP carriers and 90% (n= 34) of UFP 










Figure 5-5: Fatigue considerations in schedule design within different categories of fatigue 
performance 
 
Percentage of team drivers was higher in AFP carriers. Also, the reported percentages of 
team drivers among AFP carriers was more deviate (U (1) = 1500.5, Z= -2.2, p= .025), (     
                                   ). On contrary, percentage of drivers with 
irregular and unpredicted driving schedule was higher among UFP carriers; though, the reported 
percentage of drivers with irregular schedules deviates more among AFP carriers (U (1) = 681.5, 
Z= -6.0, p<.001), (                                          ).  
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Figure 5-6 shows that drivers in UFP carriers were working under more unpredicted and 
irregular schedule.  
 






Table 5-4 shows the null hypotheses and results of statistical tools for HOS management 
factor. There were more AFP carriers that have utilized their motor vehicles by electronic 
logbook to monitor their driver’s hours of services (χ2 (1, n=134) = 12.6, p=.001). As it is 
indicated in Table 5-7, 44% (n= 41) of AFP carriers installed electronic logbook on their motor 
vehicles; on contrary, only13% (n= 5) of UFP carriers have utilized their motor vehicles by the 
same device. 
 





Table 5-4: Null hypotheses and results of statistical tests for HOS management factor 
No. 













The distribution of ―24-Hours 
restrictions‖ is the same across 








134 3.7 2 - .138 Retain 
13 
The distribution of ―7-days 
restrictions‖ is the same across 







Square 134 1.7 
2 - .429 Retain 
14 
The distribution of ―Determination 
the least limit of sleep hours before 
work‖ is the same across categories 





the least limit 
of sleep hours 
before work 
Chi-
Square 131 2.3 
2 - .312 Retain 
15 
The distribution of ―Restriction of 
wakefulness‖ is the same across 







Square `130 4.7 
2 - .094 Retain 
16 
The distribution of ―Prevent drivers 
of driving after being declared as 
out-of-service‖ is the same across 










Square 134 4.0 
2 - .135 Retain 
17 
The distribution of ―Logbook 
system‖ is the same across 







Square 134 12.6 
1 - .001 Reject 
18 
The distribution of ―Medical 
examination‖ is the same across 







Square 127 1.9 
1 - .106 Retain 
19 
The distribution of ―On-board 
devices‖ is the same across 







Square 134 3.6 
1 - .059 Retain 
20 
The distribution of ―Reporting 
system‖ is the same across 







Square 131 4.6 
1 - .033 Reject 
21 
The distribution of ―Prevent drivers 
of loading/unloading‖ is the same 










Square 120 16.8 
1 - <.001 Reject 
22 
The distribution of ―Contact with 
shippers‖ is the same across 







Square 112 1.9 
1 - .165 Retain 
23 
The distribution of ―Give more 
time for flexible schedule‖ is the 









Square 122 2.2 





There were more UFP carriers that have implemented a reporting system for their drivers 
to report fatigue to the company (χ2 (1, n=131) = 4.7, p=.033). As it is shown in Figure 5-8, 69% 
(n=64) of AFP carriers implemented a reporting system; on the other hand, 87% (n= 33) of UFP 
carriers have implemented such a reporting system. 
 





Comparing to AFP carriers, there were more UFP carriers that prevented their drivers of 
loading/unloading tasks (χ2 (1, n=120) = 16.8, p<.001). Figure 5-9 shows that 63% (n=24) of 
UFP carriers prevented their drivers of loading/unloading tasks; in a situation that only 25% 
(n=20) of AFP carriers prevented their drivers of these tasks. 
 





Fatigue Training System 
Table 5-5 shows the null hypotheses and results of statistical tools for fatigue training 
system factor. There were more UFP carriers that trained their dispatchers on driver fatigue 
issues (χ2 (1, n=131) = 8.2, p=.004). As it is shown in Figure 5-10, 82% (n=31) of UFP carriers 
and 55% (n=51) of AFP carriers trained their dispatchers on driver fatigue. Also, more UFP 
carriers evaluated their fatigue training system (χ2 (1, n=130) = 6.8, p=.009). Figure 5-11 shows 
that 51% (n=20) of UFP carriers and 28% (n=25) of AFP carriers had implemented a fatigue 
training evaluation system.  
Table 5-5: Null hypotheses and results of statistical tests for fatigue training system factor 
No. 













The distribution of 
―New drivers 











Square 134 1.1 
1 - .301 Retain 
25 
The distribution of 
―Dispatchers 











Square 131 8.2 
1 - .004 Reject 
26 
The distribution of 
―Training 











Square 130 6.8 
1 - .009 Reject 
27 
The distribution of 
―Training 























Figure 5-11: Training evaluation within different categories of fatigue performance 
 
Other null hypotheses in Table 5-2 to Table 5-5 could not be rejected based on the 
findings of this study; thus, these hypotheses were retained. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION  
Results of the study show that comparing to AFP carriers, more UFP carriers have 
evaluated their safety programs. Also, more UFP carriers have evaluated their training system. 
These findings show that UFP carriers have recognized there was a problem in their safety 
programs and have evaluated their safety programs to identify problems. This finding confirms 
the notion by Gander (2011) that safety program evaluation is an important feature of safety 
management system in a changing environment. 
Safety program evaluation may be conducted as a ―why-it-went-wrong‖ or ―how-we-can-
improve-it‖ meetings to thoroughly audit and evaluate safety programs. Carriers were not asked 
about any specific programs regarding safety evaluation; thus, they may have implemented an 
ineffective safety evaluation program, yet they consider that as an evaluation measure.  
The point that more UFP carriers have evaluated their safety programs shows 
implementation of CSA 2010 by FMCSA made these carriers more aware about their 
unacceptable fatigue performance. Consequently, they have initiated evaluation programs to 
identify problems. 
Management assigned more budgets to enhance safety in AFP carriers. One of the 
reasons for this difference is that participated AFP carriers were larger organizations. Means of 
the total number of employed drivers were 550 (SD=1,031) for AFP carriers and 91 (SD=196) 
for UFP carriers. However, larger organizations usually allocates more budget on safety, the 
difference in the amount of allocated safety budget may indicate management commitment to 
safety in AFP carriers. This conforms Aroboleda (2003) study that stated top management 
commitment was an influential factor to safety culture and consequently safety performance. 
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Motor carriers have performed drastically different regarding considering fatigue issues 
in route and schedule design. More UFP carriers considered fatigue in route and schedule design 
phase. Also, UFP carriers have considered individual differences more than AFP carriers when 
assigning driving tasks. One of the reasons for these endeavors by UFP carriers could be the fact 
that these carriers have performed unacceptable regarding fatigue and have implemented some 
safety program to improve their fatigue performance.  
Drivers in AFP carriers followed more restricted and fixed schedules. This difference 
shows that the more fixed the schedule, the better fatigue performance. This finding confirms 
Soccomanno (1996) study that indicated reducing driver autonomy by requiring drivers to drive 
the same hours each day could enhance safety, as this practice diminishes fatigue. Also, the 
percentage of team driving was higher among AFP carriers which show this practice may 
enhance fatigue performance as well. 
More AFP carriers utilized electronic logbook for documenting and monitoring their 
drivers’ hours-of-services. Motor carriers receive violations in case their drivers have filled out 
logbooks inaccurately (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2012). This can be one of 
the reasons that UFP carriers have received more violations regarding HOS regulation. An 
electronic monitoring system reduces the human intervention and makes logbooks more 
accurate.  
Gander (2011) mentioned fatigue reporting system is a proactive fatigue control measure. 
In order to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents or accidents, safety management system in 
the trucking industry largely depends on reporting. Based on the results of this study, more UFP 
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carriers have implemented fatigue reporting systems, which indicates these carriers have 
implemented some safety programs to improve their fatigue performance.  
More UFP carriers considered fatigue training for dispatchers and have evaluated their 
training systems. These shows UFP carriers identified training system as an important safety 
program to improve fatigue performance. However, because of the lack of reevaluation of these 
carriers in this study, it cannot be concluded whether these training systems were implemented 
effectively or not.  
Overall, there are three different interpretations regarding safety practices that are 
implemented by UFP carriers. Firstly, because of the CSA warning letters that UFP carriers have 
received, they have initiated different safety programs to control their fatigue performance. The 
results of these endeavors can be traced based on the future evaluations. Another interpretation 
could be the possibility that safety programs that are implemented by UFP carriers are not 
contributed to fatigue performance improvement. Thus, in spite of implementing a safety 
program, there is minor improvement in fatigue performance. 
Thirdly, it may be suggested that these programs are effective to fatigue performance, but 
are not properly implemented by UFP carriers. In order to properly distinguish between these 
three interpretations, it is suggested that the future studies evaluate fatigue performance of 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
This study compared the organizational factors of 94 AFP motor carriers with 40 UFP 
motor carriers. It was hypothesized that these companies possessed specific organizational 
factors that resulted into their current fatigue performance. Results of the study show that safety 
budget (as a management commitment element), percentage of drivers with regular schedule (as 
a schedule design element), and utilization of electronic logbook (as an HOS management 
element) are contributing factors to improve fatigue performance in motor carriers. Figure 7-1 
shows the schematic diagram of the contributing factors to fatigue performance.  
 
Figure 7-1: Contributing factors to fatigue performance 
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Certainly, for each organizational factor there may be more elements that are contributed 
to fatigue performance, but the results of this study could only suggest safety budget, electronic 
logbook, and regular schedule as elements of contributing factors to fatigue performance. Motor 
carriers that plan to improve their fatigue performance may implement these safety practices in 
their organizations.   
In summary, implementing an external evaluation system like CSA 2010 has enabled 
interested parties in the transportation industry to identify how motor carriers are performing. 
According to CSA 2010 methodology, motor carriers are compared to their peers based on the 
type and number of their CMVs. Hence, this approach to safety evaluation is a new performance 
evaluation philosophy in safety science which is practiced in the industry. CSA 2010 has 
initiated awareness among motor carriers with unacceptable fatigue performance and made them 
evaluate and implement different safety practices in order to improve their fatigue performance. 
Recommendations 
Based on the results of this study, followings are recommendations to motor carriers in 
order to improve fatigue performance:  
 CMV drivers follow a schedule for their driving and working tasks. Following a specific 
schedule is a practice that indicates to help preventing driver fatigue. 
 Motor carriers utilize their motor vehicles by electronic logbook to document and trace 
their drivers’ hours-of-services. Electronic logbook system would reduce human error 
and enhance drivers’ ability to trace their hours of services.  
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 Management allocates more budgets to safety. Carriers that have assigned more budgets 
to safety performed better regarding fatigue.  Allocating safety budget is an important 
antecedent of management commitment to safety.  
Implementing these safety practices is not only suggested to motor carriers with 
unacceptable fatigue performance, but also carriers with acceptable fatigue performance is 
recommended to follow these practices to perform sustainably regarding their fatigue 
performance.  
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
Before conducting this research study, there were not similar evaluation studies based on 
the CSA 2010 in the transportation industry. Besides, this research study was conducted without 
any funding and in a limited time period as a Master’s Thesis. These issues brought some 
limitations to the methodology and data analysis of the study. Limitations and recommendations 
of this study are as follows: 
 This research was conducted through a survey, which is a self-reported instrument. The 
observed relationships may have been inflated artificially as a result of conservative 
responses. However, some studies show the magnitude of inflation may be overestimated 
(Crampton & Wagner, 1994), utilizing survey was identified as the only practical means 
of operationalizing the variables examined in this study in a large sample of motor 
carriers. In order to verify the results of the study, it is recommended for future studies to 




 This research was a cross-sectional study. There were some safety programs that UFP 
carriers have implemented. The design of the research prevented us from suggesting 
whether implemented safety practices by UFP carriers positively contribute to fatigue 
performance or not. It is recommended for future studies to reevaluate the participated 
carriers after a year to identify whether implemented safety programs affect CSA 
Fatigued Driving percentile in the long term or not. Secondly, if these programs 
contribute to fatigue performance, it should be studied whether these programs are 
effectively implemented by AFP and UFP carriers or not. 
 This research only studied carriers with unacceptable and acceptable fatigue 
performance. It is recommended for future research to study the average population 
regarding fatigue performance as well. 
 It is recommended to implement a measurement system like CSA 2010 in other 
industries. By doing so, there would be an external measurement system to evaluate how 
companies are performing regarding safety. 
 The data was analyzed based on the statistical tests. Because of the variation of the data, 
it is recommended to utilize decision making and design of experiment (DOE) techniques 
to validate the study as well. 
 Based on the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), it was assumed that participated carriers 
represented the acceptable and unacceptable fatigue performance carriers. For the future 
studies, it is recommended that participated carriers in these two populations be randomly 
sampled. 
 It is recommended for future studies to focus on the safety practices that based on the 
results of this study have been suggested to contribute to fatigue performance.  
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The instrumented survey in this study was developed based on a survey by Arboleda 
(2003) and reviewing previous studies. For the future studies, it is recommended to consider the 
following points regarding the survey: 
 The elements of organizational factors were identified through reviewing previous 
studies. It is recommended that these elements be weighted by a panel of experts to 
indicate how these elements are constructing organizational factors. This practice will 
improve the construct of survey. 
 Questions should be developed in a way that improves Cronbach’s Alpha. This practice 
will improve reliability of the survey. 
 In the survey, it was mentioned that participants of the study are ―trucking companies‖. 
Consequently, some motor carriers such as: oil, gas, and retail companies responded that 
they are not considered as trucking company. It is recommended that trucking companies 
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APPENDIX A: FATIGUED DRIVING VIOLATIONS 




Violation Description Shown on 
Driver/Vehicle Examination Report 












392.2H State/Local Hours-of-Service (HOS) Hours 7 Y 






15, 20, 70/80 HOS violations (Alaska-
Property) 
Hours 7 Y 
395.1(h)(2) 
15, 20, 70/80 HOS violations (Alaska-
Passenger) 
Hours 7 Y 
395.1(h)(3) 
Adverse driving conditions violations 
(Alaska) 
Hours 7 Y 
395.1(o) 16 hour rule violation (Property) Hours 7 Y 
395.3(a)(1) 
Requiring or permitting driver to drive 
more than 11 hours 
Hours 7 Y 
395.3(a)(2) 
Requiring or permitting driver to drive 
after 14 hours on duty 
Hours 7 Y 
395.3(b) 60/70 - hour rule violation Hours 7 Y 
395.3(c) 34 -hour restart violation (Property) Hours 7 Y 
395.3A1R 11 hour rule violation (Property) Hours 7 Y 
395.3A2R 14 hour rule violation (Property) Hours 7 Y 
395.3BR 60/70 - hour rule violation (Property) Hours 7 Y 
395.5(a)(1) 10 - hour rule violation (Passenger) Hours 7 Y 
395.5(a)(2) 15 - hour rule violation (Passenger) Hours 7 Y 
395.5(b) 60/70 - hour rule violation (Passenger) Hours 7 Y 
395.8 











False report of driver’s record of duty 
status 
False Log 7 Y 
395.8(f)(1) 












                                                          
1
 Violation severity weights reflect the relative importance of each violation within each BASIC.   
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Violation Description Shown on 
Driver/Vehicle Examination Report 













Onboard recording device information 
requirements not met 
EOBR Related 1 Y 
395.15(c) 
Onboard recording device improper 
form and manner 
EOBR Related 1 Y 
395.15(f) 
Onboard recording device failure and 
driver failure to reconstruct duty status 
EOBR Related 1 Y 
395.15(g) 
On-board recording device information 
not available 
EOBR Related 1 Y 
395.15(i)(5) 
Onboard recording device does not 
display required information 
EOBR Related 1 N 
398.6 
Violation of hours of service 
regulations—migrant workers 
Hours 7 Y 
                                                          
2
 Violation severity weights reflect the relative importance of each violation within each BASIC.   
 
 
APPENDIX B: AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON CSA DATABASE 
# 
Code in the 
Database 
Description # 





Number of the Motor 
Carrier 
27 INSP_TOTAL 
Total Number of 









Total Number of 









Total Number of 
Driver Inspections 







carriers' type of 
Operation; A = 
Interstate, B = 





Total Number of 
Vehicle Inspections 
for the measurement 
period 
5 HM_FLAG 
Carrier is subject to 
placardable HM 





Total Number of 
Vehicle Inspections 




Carrier is registered to 
transport passenger(s) 









Physical street address 







Threshold Indicator (Y 





Code in the 
Database 
Description # 











Violation Indicator (Y 
= Serious Violation 
from investigation 
within previous 12 
months) 
9 PHY_STATE 













within previous 12 
months) 
10 PHY_ZIP 




















Threshold Indicator (Y 













Violation Indicator (Y 
= Serious Violation 
within previous 12 
months) 










Code in the 
Database 
Description # 






Mail state of a carrier 40 DRIV_FIT_PCT 









Driver Fitness BASIC 
Roadside Performance 
Over Threshold 






Mail country of a 
carrier 
42 DRIV_FIT_SV 
Driver Fitness BASIC 
Serious Violation 
Indicator (Y = Serious 
Violation from 
investigation within 







Driver Fitness BASIC 





within previous 12 
months) 














and Alcohol BASIC 
Roadside Performance 
Over Threshold 
















Code in the 
Database 
Description # 
















and Alcohol BASIC 




















Date when carrier 
information was added 








Threshold Indicator (Y 
= Over Intervention 
Threshold) 
24 OIC_STATE 
FMCSA State office 







Violation Indicator (Y 
= Serious Violation 
from investigation 





















Number of drivers 
reported 
52   
 
 
APPENDIX C:  EMAIL TO THE EXPERT PANEL 
Dear Expert, 
I am requesting your help in providing feedback on a survey, since you are an expert in 
transportation safety. 
This survey is a part of my Master of Science Thesis in the Occupational Safety program 
at East Carolina University.  The purpose of this study is to identify the organizational factors 
that contribute to trucking companies’ safety performance, based on the Compliance Safety 
Accountability (CSA) system.  I am seeking your response by Monday, January 30, 2012. 
Would you please take a few minutes to complete the survey and provide your feedback?  
I am specifically interested to know if the survey meets the following characteristics: 
 Appropriate in length 
 Questions are clearly stated 
 Helps the respondents to think about his/her organization 
 Easy to access 
 Easy to navigate. 
After your review and feedback, this survey will be modified and distributed among a 
randomly selected group of trucking companies.  Your feedback will help us to enhance the 
effectiveness of this survey in the design phase and before it is launched. 
In the survey, specific space is designated for “your comments” regarding each 
question.  If you have no comments to a question, simply go to the next question.  A link to the 




Thank you in advance for sharing your expertise to help the safety profession excel and 
grow based on scientific findings.  I am looking forward to receiving your comments by 






APPENDIX D: SURVEY 
Introduction 
As a person who is involved with safety challenges in a trucking company, you are 
invited to participate in a research study by completing an on-line survey.  The purpose of this 
study is to determine how trucking companies can improve their safety performance 
and subsequently improves their Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA 2010) percentile 
ranks. Your participation in this survey will be anonymous and voluntary. It should take 
approximately 10 -12 minutes to complete the survey.   
Risks/Discomforts:  
There are no known risks to you and your Company if you complete this survey.       
Benefits: 
As a benefit for participating in this survey, you will receive the results and findings of 
this study with specific recommendations. This is a great opportunity to share your knowledge 
and expertise in order to collectively improve the efforts of safety professionals and more 
specifically, safety in the trucking industry. The results and findings of this study will be in 
aggregated format and names or identities will not be released.  
Confidentiality: 
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential. The results and findings of 





Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any 
time or refuse to participate entirely without any penalty.  
Questions about the Research: 
If you have any questions regarding this survey, you may contact Occupational Safety 
program at East Carolina University, at 252-328-9716, fonoonih@ecu.edu. 
I have read and understood the above, and I accept to participate in this study.  
 Yes  
 No  




Q1 Which best describes your job duties? 
 Only responsible for carrier safety  
 Responsible for carrier safety but with additional duties (e.g., dispatching, human 
resources, etc.)  
 Other (please specify duties briefly)  ____________________ 
Q2 What is the primary type of your Company's business? (Check all that apply.) 
 Truckload  
 Less-than-Truckload  
 Bulk/Tankers  
 Hazmat  
 Specialized  
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
Q3 Approximately, how many drivers are employed in each category in your Company? (Put 0 if 
it is not applicable.) 
______ Company drivers  
______ Owner-operators  
______ Temporary  
______ Leased drivers  
______ Other  
Q4 How does your Company pay your drivers? (Check all that apply.) 
 By salary  
 By the mile  
 By hour  
 By trip  
 By percentage of the load  
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 





 Yes No I do not know 
On-time delivery       
Safe driving       
In the following questions, please respond with ―Yes‖ if the sentences are applicable in 
your Company and ―No‖ if they are not applicable.  
Q6 Our Company evaluates driving safety programs regularly. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q7 After evaluating the driving safety programs, our Company has a process in place to follow-
up with corrective actions to address all deficiencies (i.e., engineering controls, disciplinary 
actions, training, etc.). 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q8 Our Company has a formal policy regarding managing drivers' fatigue. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q9 Our Company has a reporting system in place that drivers can inform the Company in case 
they experience fatigue or fatigue-related incidents. 
 Yes  
 No  





Q10 Our Company's annual driving safety budget is: 
 None  
 Less than $10,000  
 $10,001 - $20,000  
 $20,001- $30,000  
 Over $30,001  
Q11   Regarding the Hours-of-Service (HOS) regulation by FMCSA, our Company has 
policy/procedures that: 
 
Yes, and it is a 
written policy 
Yes, but it is not 
a  written policy 
No I do not know 
Restrict the 
amount of 
driving time per 
24 hours 
        
Restrict the 
amount of 
driving time per 
7-day period 
        
Restrict the 
amount of sleep 
before starting 
the work 
















Q12 What kind of log book system does your Company utilize? 
 Paper Log Book  
 Electronic Log Book  
 I do not know  
 Other (please specify)  ____________________ 
Q13 Which of the following strategies is implemented in your Company for controlling drivers' 
fatigue? 
 Yes No I do not know 
Prevent drivers of 
loading/unloading       
Contract with 
shippers/receivers that 
require idling pay at 
the dock 
      
Give drivers more 
time for a flexible 
schedule 
      
Q14 Our Company evaluates sleep disorders such as sleep apnea during medical examination. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q15 Our Company has installed on-board devices such as "lane tracker system," "head and eye 
blink monitors," in our trucks that monitor drivers' fatigue level. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q16 Our Company encourages dispatchers to take individual drivers’ differences into account 
when making driving assignments? (i.e., some drivers maybe more or less susceptible to fatigue, 
some drivers may experience more drowsiness when driving at night.) 
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 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q17 Our Company considers fatigued driving issues when assigning ROUTES to drivers. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q18 Our Company considers fatigued driving issues when assigning/designing driver 
SCHEDULES.     
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q19   Approximately, what percentage of your drivers falls into each classification? (Total 
should be 100; put 0 if it is not applicable in your Company.) 
______ Percentage of solo drivers  
______ Percentage of team drivers (a pair of drivers for each truck)  
Q20 Approximately, what percentage of your drivers falls into each category? (Total should be 
100; put 0 if it is not applicable in your Company.) 
______ Percentage of fixed schedule drivers  
______ Percentage of drivers with Irregular and unpredictable schedule  
The following questions are related to Fatigued Driving training. (Training on Fatigued 
Driving covers Hours-of-Service (HOS), Night Driving, Fatigue, Fatigue Control, etc.) 
Q21 Fatigued Driving is included in our Company's safety training programs for new drivers. 
 Yes  
 No  




Q22 Dispatchers in our Company receive training on Fatigued Driving. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q23 Our Company has a process in place to evaluate the effectiveness of our Fatigued Driving 
training programs. 
 Yes  
 No  
 I do not know  
Q24 How frequently does your Company provide refresher training on Fatigued Driving to your 
drivers? 
 Never  
 At least once a month  
 At least once every six months  
 At least once a year  
 As needed   
Q25 Which method(s) does your Company use to train your drivers? (Check all that apply.) 
 Face-to-face training sessions  
 Computer-based training sessions  
 Verbal instruction by dispatchers  
 Other (please specify)  ____________________ 
 
 
Q26 Has your Company provided training directly related to CSA 2010 to your drivers? 
 Yes, we had one training session or related activity  
 Yes, we have had two or more training sessions or related activities  
 No  
Q27 In this section, please provide your Company’s CSA percentile ranks on Unsafe Driving 
and Fatigued Driving categories.   Input the numbers without percentage sign (%).  
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Unsafe Driving: ………….. 
Fatigued Driving (Hours-of-Service): ……….. 
Q28   How many reportable crashes with injuries/fatalities have your Company reported to the 
FMCSA during the last two years? 
Number of reportable crashes with Injuries/fatalities: …………… 
If you do not have the required information in the above questions, it can be obtained 









APPENDIX F:  EMAIL TO COMPANIES 
If you are not in charge of safety in your Company, please forward this email to the 
person who is in charge of safety: 
Master of Science in Occupational Safety program at East Carolina University is 
conducting a study to determine how trucking companies can improve their safety performance 
and subsequently improve their Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA 2010) percentile 
ranks. 
Your participation in this survey will be anonymous and voluntary. It should take 
approximately 8-10 minutes to complete the survey.  
As a benefit for participating in this survey, you will receive the results and findings of 
this study with specific recommendations. This is a great opportunity to share your knowledge 
and expertise in order to collectively improve the efforts of safety professionals and more 
specifically, safety in the trucking industry. The results and findings of this study will be in 
aggregated format and names or identities will not be released. 
To start the survey, please click on: ―Take the Survey‖   





Thank you in advance for your willingness to share your expertise to help the safety 
profession excel and grow based on scientific findings.  We are looking forward to receiving 




MS, Occupational Safety 
East Carolina University 
241 Science and Technology Building  
Greenville, NC  27858 
 
